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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 000445

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [PTER](#) [EUN](#) [ER](#) [SO](#) [IR](#) [GG](#) [SW](#)  
SUBJECT: JULY GAERC FOLLOW-UP WITH THE SWEDES

REF: STOCKHOLM 428

Classified By: PolCouns Marc Koehler for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d).

Summary:  
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11. (C) On July 17 and 20, Post followed-up on reftel GAERC demarche with Ambassador Marika Fahlen, MFA Horn of Africa Special Envoy; Johan Frisell, Georgia Desk Officer; and Magnus Scholdtz, EU Correspondent.

--On Iran, they expect no "concrete steps" at the GAERC on additional sanctions until September, though "mental" planning may start. Sweden will "not resist" EU autonomous sanctions if "every possible effort" has been made to get Russia and China on board a UN Security Council resolution.

--On Somalia, the GAERC will likely agree to extended support for the AMISOM mission.

--On Georgia, Sweden would welcome U.S. participation in the EU Monitoring Mission, but the Council Secretariat and some other EU Member States worry about the impression of a "big Western gang" against Russia. At the July GAERC, Sweden will aim to secure support for a long-term EU mission, and then return to the issue of third party involvement.

End Summary.

Eritrea and Al-Shabaab  
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12. (C) Sweden supports the Djibouti Peace Process and recognizes the importance of the TFG. Amb. Fahlen said controlling how donated funds are used is not enough, there also must be budgetary controls and planning. Fahlen said Sweden would very much appreciate intelligence-sharing on Eritrea. Eritrea "constantly denies" the presence of foreign fighters and uses this denial to gain political advantage. She argued that profiting from international aid is a government "business." The government gives food aid, for example, to Al-Shabaab, which sells it for money to continue its fighting. She added that Somali pirates are helping Al-Shabaab transport foreign fighters in exchange to be able to operate. Scholdtz stated that there had been no discussions within the EU about putting Al-Shabaab back onto the terrorist designation list. However, HR Javier Solana has sent a letter around to Member States exploring various options and, due to recent events, the French have pushed for action in the security sector.

Somalia and AMISOM  
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13. (C) As to AMISOM, Fahlen said Sweden agrees more support should be given to the TMG, but any EU language will be "subtle." In a separate meeting, Scholdtz told PolCouns that at the GAERC, the foreign ministers will agree to continued

support for AMISOM. Fahlen said the EU cannot give funds directly to a single state to run a non-UN operation, so funds can only be given to the AU, which, according to Fahlen, is not competent to handle the funds effectively. Scholdtz noted that because of the chaotic situation on the ground, it is tough for the EU to "talk about concrete steps as they cannot even send in an assessment mission" and therefore the AU and AMISOM were the only options currently available. Bilaterally, Sweden has given USD 1.5 million in support of security forces to pay the salaries of Somali soldiers. Fahlen said Sweden would like to see better training and more troops for AMISOM, which might entail a change of mandate. The GAERC might discuss the role of the International Contact Group and splitting it up into subgroups.

EUMM

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¶4. (C) Poloff raised the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Frisell. He stated that now is not the time for the EU to discuss "new inventions" of the EUMM. The first priority is to extend the mandate at the July 27-8 GAERC. Other possible points of discussion at the GAERC include the UN's presence post (UNAMIG), increasing information gathering, and including third countries in EUMM. Frisell said the real debate on these topics will occur at the September GAERC. FM Bildt supports third country involvement, including by the United States, Turkey and Norway, but not all EU members agree. Scholdtz also told PolCouns that Sweden is in favor of U.S. participation, but that other Member States and the Council Secretariat were resistant out of fear of creating the impression of a "big Western gang" against Russia and for

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Georgia. Therefore, Sweden's current priority is to line-up commitments from Member States for a long-term EU presence in Georgia. Discussion over U.S. involvement as a third party would complicate that goal. Third country involvement with the EU on any issue tends to be complicated for reasons unrelated to possible U.S. participation ) in this case, Turkey, Scholdtz said when asked.

¶5. (C) Frisell said the Swedes are concerned about the kind of presence the UN will have after UNAMIG's dismantling. The EU and UN Security Council need to discuss this, and also negotiate with Moscow. Without UNAMIG, the EU will lose an important source of information and the EU is concerned with how to increase its capacity to monitor Russian compliance with the August 12 and September 8 agreements. One idea is to rely more on satellite imagery. It was noted by Scholdtz that the UN has been trying to find a way to have a footprint in Georgia when the UNAMIG leaves; the Germans are driving a discussion to morph the EU presence into a UN presence. Sweden is vehemently opposed to that concept, said Scholdtz, because Russia would then be able to veto any decision involving the Mission.

Prisoners in Iran

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¶6. (C) When PolCouns met with Scholdtz, the last British embassy local had just been released on bail. The Swedes were checking, but believed the other eight had been released unconditionally. Scholdtz indicated that information about her release was sketchy, but that money was being transferred to pay the bail. The EU hopes the incident can be resolved without a trial. Scholdtz promised to provide more information on the case as the situation became clearer.

¶7. (C) Scholdtz said there is still EU concern over the detention of French teacher Clothilde Reiss. He said the Iranian government, unlike in the cases of the British workers, "came on very strong and aggressive," claiming they had proof the French citizen was instigating the recent unrest. The issue involving the UK employees was a

"diplomatic case" because they worked at the embassy, but that of the French national is a "consular case," he said. The Swedes do not want the EU to set a precedent by advocating for "any EU citizen arrested anywhere in the world for any crime." The Swedes understand the issue is an "enormous concern for the French government," but it is time for the Presidency to "draw a line in the sand," he said.

¶18. (C) The Swedes propose having the Troika demarche Iranian FM Mottaki (they would likely be given Deputy FM Mahdi Safari, opined Scholdtz), which the French will likely support. The Troika would first "thank the MFA" for its help in releasing the British Embassy worker ("Iran did something nice for us so we need to be friendly for a few hours," he commented). After, the Troika would issue the demarche, "letting the Iranians know that the EU-27 was standing together" for the French teacher's release. A press release might be issued, but not an EU Presidency statement. The EU would then work behind the scenes to let the French know that no more could be done by the EU. The idea floated for the British Embassy employees -- to "slow down" visas for Iranian officials -- would likely not be applied to the French teacher's case, Scholdtz argued, unless the French were able to raise "significant sympathy in the Council." He added that some Member States, such as Spain, Romania and Bulgaria, have bilateral agreements with Iran and do not require visas for Iranian officials.

¶19. (C) In addition, the Swedes were contemplating a second demarche to protest the arrest of academics, human rights activists and opposition candidates, which Scholdtz argued were "more important issues that we have been a bit slow to react to."

#### Nuclear Iran and Sanctions

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¶10. (C) Scholdtz did not anticipate the GAERC delivering any action on "concrete, prudent planning" for further sanctions on Iran, but there would be "mental" planning through August.

The overriding GAERC goal is to figure out "how clear all the Member States intend to be on a timetable for an Iranian response to the P5 1 offer." Scholdtz directed Poloffs to FM Carl Bildt's recent speech to the European Parliament where he was explicit that there was a time limit on waiting for Iran to make positive steps: the UN General Assembly in September, when all world leaders will be gathered together.

¶11. (C) Scholdtz said that the EU PolDirs need to decide whether there should be a full, new set of sanctions if Iran does not reply meaningfully, or if there should be more done

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under the existing sanctions regime. He urged that the UN Security Council be the focus of U.S. efforts. If "every possible effort was made to involve the Council and it was clear that Russia and China were being obstructionist," then the Swedes would "not resist" EU autonomous sanctions on Iran. He noted that "there were many voices in Russia," and Moscow's calculus may have changed after developments on the Nabucco pipeline and the Eastern Partnership. The Russians "do not want a nuclear armed Iran, but they want to sell weapons and technology to the Iranians." Scholdtz posited that Russia would be "willing to sell out Iran" if the U.S. gave them something in return.

#### A Points

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¶12. (C) There are a few secondary items on the GAERC agenda.

-- The British are expected to make a "big deal" about Burma, said Scholdtz, but he does not expect any policy change until August at the earliest, after the ASEAN meetings. The Swedes are currently planning for a negative verdict in the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. The "Brits are asking for everything and

because they want everything there is no consensus on anything,<sup>8</sup> Scholdtz told PolCouns. He noted that further financial sanctions against the Burmese regime are being held-up by some of the "big Member States."

-- The EU will push and remind Kenya to continue the democratic process of reforms and reconciliation.

-- With regards to Moldova, the EU hopes for continued calm in the lead-up to the election. A demarche was delivered by the EU Presidency on July 20, reminding both the government and the opposition of their responsibility to ensure the election is democratic. Polish FM Radoslaw Sikorski will visit Chisinau next week on behalf of the EU Troika and foreign ministers.

-- The situation in Honduras is due for a short discussion during the GAERC lunch, but Scholdtz predicted decisive events will have already occurred by the time of the meeting.  
SILVERMAN